Henry,

I think it is important to focus on realistic expectations and examining cause and effect. I am interested in hearing what your ancestor had to say about Saffold--I always retain the right to change my mind when confronted with better data!

Few CSN vessels were reliable according to the historical record. I don't see why the Chattahoochee should be held to a higher standard than the rest. She could and did float, move about, and could stem the current--something a great many other CSN vessels could not do. (In my opinion this pretty much doomed the CSN's efforts to protect harbors. Consistently going 1 for 3 or so on a building program is not something the CSN could afford and still achieve success.)

If the obstructions were not cleared the Chattahoochee wasn't going anywhere. This is a problem that arose frequently, even with ironclads. It wasn't in the vessel commander or even local naval authorities' control in many circumstances. Furthermore, if they were cleared then success would be fleeting. Sure the boat could raise hell for awhile, but it wouldn't last. Opening the obstructions would pose a threat to the CSA. That is because there were no ironclads to back her up--and that wasn't the Saffold yard's fault. Columbus and Confederate iron plate production (as well as the rail system) weren't up to the task either although they were trying.

While it's a good idea to have a decent vessel in reserve behind obstruction and to pose some potential threat, if you don't have a building program that will pose a sustained threat, then why open another front with limited resources? That has the makings of a strategic blunder, siphoning off limited resources from areas where they had more potential use.

With regards to the Virginia: the sources I have read indicated that the Virginia was burned because she could not be made light enough to head up river. Her port fell and she couldn't go elsewhere because of her draft. Attempts to lighten her exposed her so that she couldn't risk a fight. You can propose alternate reasoning if you like, but she would not have been burned if she could have been taken up river. Deep draft ironclads were a dead end for the CSN.

Southern industrial manufacturing ability was poor on day one. That is a result of long-standing economic drivers that came from climate, geography, local markets, etc. The relative industrial weakness is in many ways an economic effect of relying on a very profitable agricultural commodity and importing industrial equipment rather than producing at home. I can't argue with the allocation of capital since it was maximizing the Southern market return, but it didn't put them on a good war footing. (Per Dew's book, even Anderson at Tredegar couldn't come close to competing with northern iron works on a cost basis for the same material. Southern iron cost on average 30% more in 1860 than the average of the highest cost competing region--Western States.)

In retrospect, the Union's strategic approach wasn't so much an effort to destroy the Southern industrial base as prevent it from building up in the first place. The Union was aided in this regard by CSA conscription practices. The CSA started with a weak industrial base and a limited skilled labor pool for it, then gutted that labor pool. It certainly didn't help that most of the remaining folks on the homefront (slaves) had been systematically denied education. There were many very talented folks who improvised and worked relative miracles creating necessary Southern industry, but they had to do so to keep the CSA in it. What makes their achievements so impressive to me is how little they often started with.

Best regards,

Shawn