The Anaconda Plan
The first military strategy offered to President Abraham Lincoln for crushing the rebellion of Southern states was devised by Union General-in-Chief Winfield Scott. From April 1 through early May 1861 Scott briefed the president daily, often in person, on the national military situation; the results of these briefings were used by Scott to work out Union military aims.
About 3 May Scott told his protégé, Maj. Gen. George B. McClellan, that he believed an effective "Blockade" of Southern ports, a strong thrust down the Mississippi Valley with a large force, and the establishment of a line of strong Federal positions there would isolate the disorganized Confederate nation "and bring it to terms."
This plan developed as the year 1861 progressed. Military engineer John Gross Barnard, who had worked on several of the military works in the Southern states, figures prominently in detailed development of the attack plan that by early September included amphibious operations on the lower Mississippi River with a goal of taking the city of New Orleans. The Atlantic coast was to be attacked at North Carolina and Georgia as prelude to blockade by naval forces.This planning, much of it done in the Willard Hotel's back room, across the street from the Ford Theatre, gelled into orders by September 18, 1861. The 13" Seacoast Mortar figured prominently in force projection abilities, both for the naval arm attacking from the North using the rivers and that naval force attacking from the Gulf of Mexico through the Louisiana Delta northward. Orders to E.I. DuPont, Frankford Arsenal, Fort Pitt and the naval yards in Philadelphia, Pa. and New York, as well as the yard in Washington, D.C. made the regions active in producing military equipment for the planned pincer movement apon the South. The financial pathways were circumvented by direct infusion of funds collected in abolishionist meetings in New York City and Chicago. By the middle of January, 1862 the Federal military had transformed from a garrison force into an army and navy of considerable offensive strength. By 1865 the North had well over one million men under arms.
Ft. Pulaski, in the estuary that is the confluent to the city of Savannah, Georgia, was the initial operational debut of the Federal use of the 13" Seacoast Mortar. A few bugs remained in the weapon, as related by Adm. Samuel Francis DuPont in the April 12th, 1862 letter to his wife, Sophie, regarding the attack on Ft. Pulaski.:
"One item has disappointed me-those great mortars are a dead failure; they did nothing at all, went wild, burst in the air, and caused no apprehension at all to the garrison. I am worried about this because this is the great dependence, those 13 inch mortars, that our friends in the Gulf are looking to, to reduce the forts in the Mississippi."
The attack on Ft. Pulaski did have its success, destruction of the works being accomplished through direct fire from rifled tubes.
The attacking force in the Gulf did not seem to have the accuracy problems associated with the attack on Ft. Pulaski, though the problem of long fuzes caused many of the thousands of shells fired to bore 18 to 20 feet into the soft ground before exploding. The performance of the mortar flotilla is commendable in that no accidents occurred during the 7 days of firing. One schooner, Dan Smith, fired 493 shells. Maximum range to Fort St. Philip was 4,710 yards and required a 23-pound charge against the wind. Best sustained rate of fire was 2 2/3 minutes per projectile, although projectiles could be fired every 5 minutes with greater ease.
Suffice it to say that with time and pressure the Anaconda Plan succeded.