Well, sir, let's let the folks out there get beyond the opinions--and I sure hope you follow up on your promise to refute Bowen--so, here's Bowen's professorial data in short form:

It is worth noting that no books on the Border War published in the last twenty-five years-- new publications or reprinted versions of books with revised introductions--have mentioned the two seminal articles by Bowen on the Border War. These articles, analytical studies of 1860 Missouri Census data, destroy the notion that the Missouri guerrillas were lowlife thugs, involved in the war for blood lust and booty. Bowen’s study demonstrates, beyond rational doubt, that the Missouri guerrillas and their close supporters were the sons and daughters of western Missouri elites, not the sort of young men expected to form, en masse, a “bandit army” of 300 men.

So who were these guerrillas, so maligned, so demonized, by most historians and writers for more than 130 years? In the 1970s, Don R. Bowen examined demographic data from the Census of 1860 for Jackson County, Missouri, to determine the guerrillas’ background in relation to the following:
(1) Age; (2) state, territory or country of birth; (3) number and order of siblings; (4) residence in 1860; (5) occupation, if any; (6) marital status; (7) number of children; (8) value of real property owned, 1860; (9) value of personal property owned, 1860; (10) number of slaves owned, if any; (11) regular military service in either the Missouri State Guards or the Confederate States Army; and (12) regular military rank . . . [Bowen also determined in relation to the guerrillas’ parents, their] (1) occupation, (2) value of real property owned, 1860; (3) value of personal property owned, 1860; (4) number of slaves owned, if any.

These are relatively objective, unbiased criteria for establishing the true social position of the guerrillas for those honestly interested in discovering it. In Bowen’s thorough, but largely ignored study, he concluded that one-third of the guerrilla leaders owned slaves; three quarters of their parents did. Of the guerrilla followers, one-tenth owned slaves, while half of their parents owned slaves. Because slave owning was rare in the general population, it is easily seen that these young men were from the more prominent, affluent families in the area. Bowen said, the guerrillas were not only better off than the general population of Jackson county, they were, generally speaking, “very much better off,” in fact, “in terms of the times, wealthy people.”

Buttressing the assumption of the social prominence of the guerrillas and their families, Bowen also demonstrated that three-quarters of the guerrilla leaders, at some time, were lieutenants or above in the army of the Confederate States or the Missouri State Guard. According to Bowen, the leaders of the guerrillas were the kind of men who, in ordinary times, would have filled leadership positions in their communities. In addition, they were well-socialized members of their communities--an extremely important feature for guerrillas, who depend ordinarily on local support to survive.

Bowen concluded that the guerrilla leaders were largely “the sons and heirs of an established local elite.” Over 90 percent of the guerrillas’ fathers held middle- to upper- class positions in the community, and their slave property alone was worth “double the county-wide mean.” All of this, of course, negates Connelley’s ridiculous contention that the guerrillas were “White Trash” and makes the contention that they were ordinary thieves highly questionable.

Bowen contends that the Union occupation of western Missouri threatened the property of the guerrilla families, their status, and, in some cases, their lives. According to Bowen’s search of the index of the U.S. Army’s Official Record, the guerrilla families, in respect to the Federal Army, suffered “search of property, seizure of property (livestock, crops, slaves, etc.), destruction of property (burning of buildings, shootings of horses, etc.), arrest or detainment of persons, forced bail or bond giving, forced removal of families, summary execution, [and] execution by court martial.” According to Bowen’s count, ninety-three guerrilla families were subjected to the above sanctions during the war. The threat to the property of the young guerrillas’ families by the Federal forces was also a menace to the young guerrillas’ own future estates and status. In response, and largely for that reason, the young guerrillas waged war on the Federal army and its allies, the Missouri militias--not for plunder, as many historians contend.