The Indiana in the Civil War Message Board

A story of the Surrender at Harper' s Ferry

The following is a retype of a newspaper article that was in the National Tribune newspaper printed in Washington D.C., from Thursday, December 18, 1902, written by Frederick W. Fout, First Lietenant, 15th Indiana Battery.

Some interesting points in his article is the first hand insights on the actions, words, and observations of a Civil War Soldier.

We would be interested in your comments, since it was written almost 104 years ago, by Renee's great great grandfather.

National Tribune

Washington D.C.

Thursday, December 18, 1902

Harper’s Ferry

A Story of the Surrender, by one of the Garrison ---------------------------------------------------- By Frederick W. Fout, First Lieutenant, 15th. Ind. Battery

In an article by O.D. Johnson during July, 1902, in your paper, he claims that the shot that killed Col. Miles at Harper’s Ferry, was fired from the northwest direction, west of Bolivar Heights, from a battery stationed on the Martinsburg, Williamsport or Shepherdstown Road. In this the comrade is mistaken. The position referred in lower and much bellows the level of Bolivar Heights, and more than one and a half miles distance from where Miles was wounded. According to the Confederate report the enemies had no battery there, but were placed in position by their able Chief of Artillery on Maryland Heights, Londonn Heights, Londonn Flats, Bull’s Mountain, and on the Wincester Pike, all positions from which they had a plunging and destructive fire on Camp Hill, and on our thin lines on Camp Hill.

In the Antietam campaign Lee’s army contained 42 brigades. Twenty-six of these, under the command of Stonewall Jackson, had been detached to capture Miles at Harper’s Ferry with three brigades viz: White’s, D’Utassy’s and Trimbles. Sixteen brigades of Lee’s army under his personal command – Longstreet’s and D. H. Hill commands – remained on the Maryland side of the Potomac, and did battle against McClellan’s army of about 100,000 men. Yet, with all of these facts on record, writers and comrades refer to Miles’s surrender of three brigades to Jackson overpowering 26 brigades as disgraceful: but the truth is that a handling of the 100,000 men of the Potomac Army on the Maryland side of the river was the real disgrace in the affair. When on the morning of September 15, Miles saw that no relief could be expected from McClellan’s army, and the artillery fire had ceased on our side for want of ammunition, and the Confederate side preparation to a charge. Miles called his brigade commanders for consultation near the cemetery on the Winchester Pike in Bolivar, and all agreed on the uselessness of a further effort. (And all of three brigade commanders proved themselves worthy, brave men ever thereafter.)

General White was sent out on the Winchester Pike to arrange the surrender. Col. Miles walked directly at right angles up to a section of artillery then in my charge, and with I had open, after silence of firing, reopened the fire on the enemy. Miles had already pulled and waved his white handkerchief, in our rear, as he approached, but had not notified us; therefore a piece was fired after he had shown the white signal to the enemy, who promptly noticed this and now lustily cheered. Corp’s Wm II. Johnson, known in our batter as “Rocky” Johnson, ordered the last guy fired, and John Gimber, now of Indianapolis, pulled the lanyard for the last short at the now jubilant enemy. This started the whole outfit of Confederate artillery again to open fire on us. Miles now reached the guns that were being rel0aded, and in these words said; “Orderly (I was then Orderly-Sergeant) cease firing. It is of no use; we have to surrender. With this he waved his white handkerchief again, causing new yells on the enemy’s side. Corp’l Wm H. Johnson, who stood by my side, then remarked, “Colonel, we surely did not come here to surrender to these rebels. Let us fight them.” To this Miles remarked, “It is no use,” pointing over to Maryland, “We cannot be relieved by our people over there.” Miles with his aid, Liet. Binney, walked to our left, and about 50 yards from us a piece of shell fired from a gun on Loudonn Flats, then not over 500 yards distant wounded him. He died two days later. In his report he recommends my promotion for services in the battery. It has been claimed that Comrade C. D. Johnson made the remark to Miles about not surrendering. This is a mistake. Corp’l Wm. H. Johnson, known as “Rocky” Johnson, is entitled to that credit.

The artillery fire continued at us for some time, but to stop it a Confederate color-bearer on a fierce charger, with the red battle flag our of Southern friends, the enemy, road at a fearful pace on the Winchester Pike toward us on Bolivar Hights, and swinging the flag called on our men to hoist the wife flag. To this Corp’l Wm. H. Johnson again remarked to him. “You are off your beat: but if you want a white flag raised repeated you will have to raise it by yourself.”

The enemy’s artillery, which had taken notice of the Confederate cross on our guns, ceased firing, and soon appeared a cook left in camp by the 11th N. Y. with a piece of white linen, and tied this to a lone tree near us as an emblem of the surrender.

The four guns under Capt. Von Sehlen, on the extreme northern end of Bolivar Heights, had been spending their ammunition by firing on Sugar Load Mountain, just north, and in the angle of the Potomac, to no purpose. Sugar Loaf Mountain would have been a good place for a Confederate battery to have swept Bolivar Hights from the north, just the same as the enemy’s guns on Sugar Loaf Mountain, and it was this route that Col. Davis escaped with his cavalry, which was one of the finest and coolest movements made during the civil war. The 15th Ind. Battery was soon together in a park on the Winchester Pike, with the exception of two caissons, which had tumbled down an embankment near the Potomac River after the surrender, and became a considerable controversy between Jackson and A. P. Hill on the Confederate Side and Capt. Von Sehlen on the Federal side. The result was that as soon as the Confederates entered our lines with infantry a strong guard was placed around us, which was not done over the other prisoners. We now saw Jackson in his loose-fitting uniform, slouch hat and big boots, ride by on a sorrel mare at full gallop, receiving the plaudits of his men. One of our men remarked as me passed by, “Boy, he is not much for looks, but if he had him, we would had him, we would not be in this fix.” We also had a change to inspect their field artillery, which showed that they did not have a tanner of the General Grant kind, in the South: for instead of leather harness they had to use cotton rope, probably au emblem of the Cotton Confederacy they tried to establish. Their horses were under good care, and as soon as halted the drivers would dismount to rest the teams. Limbers and caissons were not loaded with knapsacks, and no connoneer was permitted to ride. All of this was in favor or lightening the load for the horses. The Confederates did not lose much time with us, although we were mixed together, and met as long lost friends as soon as we were within hearing of each other. But they took leave of us, and marched the way of Winchester Pike to Shepherdstown and Williamsport Road over the Potomac to Antietam, where McClellan was waiting to attack them as soon as they were all their, for he had failed to destroy the 16 brigades while the 26 brigades were around us, but it was shown that neither Lee nor Jackson was Frederick the Great, a Napoleon, a Blucher, a Moltke, a Grant, a Sherman, or a Sheridan, for if either been any of those, they would not have marched back to Antietam, but with at least 21 brigades would have crossed the Potomac at the Point of Rocks and Fallen on McClellan’s rear and base of supplies then at Frederick, Maryland and placed themselves between McClellan’s army, with Baltimore and Washington at their mercy. But this country was not to be divided hence Lee and Jackson did not grasp the opportunity, with less risk against McClellan then at Antietam.

Part of Walker’s and A. P. Hill’s Divisions marched all day and night on the 15th to get back to Maryland and to help Lee, and A. P. Hill was very anxious to get the prisoners off his hands. D’Utassy, to whose brigades we belonged, believing that everything was fare in love and war, reported early in the morning on the 16th at A. P. Hill’s headquarters, and asked for a pass for his brigade through his lines. The Confederate General was still in his slumbers, and asked D’Utassy where he and his officers had signed the parole at General Anderson’s headquarters. D’Utassy answered affirmative, and Hill ordered the pass issued. Not a word of D’Utassy’s was true. He had simply lied his way out of the enemy’s clutches. But at the exchange his, lying availed him not. He also had a number of horses and mules passing out of his private property, by hanging blankets over the backs of the animals. He afterward claimed these as his own, but as one of his enemies, an officer of his regiment had furnished the Government with information, he was hauled into court and sent to Sing Sing for the rest of the war. There were others equally as guilty, but their subordinates did not inform the Government, and by the recovery of the animals the incident was closed for them.

On the second day of our march, September 17, we reached Frederick, and every nook and corner where Lee and Jackson and Longstreet had slept, and dined and wined was closely watched and examined by us. But my positive recollection the old German woman, “Barbara Fritchie,” had not been heard of. That heroine, like many heroes since the war, had not then had time to be manufactured, and to me at least, the whole story about her is sheerest rot, as or as our battery had a large number of Germans, I among them, we had conversed with many Germans in Frederick, who told us many stories, but not one word about Barbara Fritchie and her flag. Other false reports on the Confederate side, is the capture of 72 cannons at Harper’s Ferry. The truth is that only 42 pieces were capture. The rest were old Iron and brass, left there as worthless to the Confederates when the Ferry was vacated by Gen. Joseph E. Johnston, in 1861, and of no value to as, or to the enemy, but in the round-up for Jackson’s glory they were counted.

Harper’s Ferry would have been relieved, if General Franklin had sown a little more energy to get to us with his corps; but it is due to General Slocum, one of his division commanders, that he along showed any energy on the morning of September 15 to help us. Franklin intended to wait until the fog disappeared, and therefore did not move. The cause of the surrender was not the fault of Miles and his men, but the authorities in Washington and General McClellan, then commanding the Army of the Potomac, nearly 100,000 strong. It is due to McClellan that before he left Washington he recommended the withdrawal of Miles from Harper’s Ferry to Hagerstown, or to Maryland Hights, then to destroy the pontoon bridges across the Potomac and hold out to the last, but the Washington authorities did not concur in this suggestion, and simply relied on McClelland activity to relieve Miles, and sent instruction to the latter to hold Harper’s Ferry. One of the amusing incidents at the Harper’s Ferry surrender was a New York States militia regiment, wherein each member carried his pet cat. The Confederates permitted them to carry their pets home, but retained their fine Springfield rifles for further use on their side of the cause.