President Abraham Lincoln's Cabinet held no regular meetings in the days attending the crisis in Charleston, South Carolina in April of 1861, nor for several weeks subsequently, but the heads of departments were frequently conviened, always by special summons through the Secretary of State. The Secretary of State, William H. Seward, was appraised of every meeting and never failed in attendance, whatever the subject matter. Seward stated that the President had only to send word to the State Department at any time of day or night when he wanted to call his Cabinet together. It was decided in May of 1861 that, instead of partial gatherings, the Cabinet should assemble at meridian on Tuesdays and Fridays.

Research has revealed to me that the actual architect of the overall movement against the Southern rebellion was not an assemblage of military men or the President, but the Attorney General of the United States, Edward Bates. The heads of the various departments seem to have been forced by events to focus on small portions of the problem of how to deal with the insurrection facing them; Bates' memorandum of April 15, 1861 appears to have been influential in the implimentation of strategy as actually used in the course of events, much concerning the use of the Federal Navy.

Henry E. Whittle 6/03/10

Extract from the Diary of Edward Bates 1859-1866

Edited By Howard K. Beale
United States Government printing Office
Washington:1933

Apl:15th Memo: of E Bates in Cabinet.

Now that we are at open war, it is my opinion.

1 That the mails ought to be stopped in the revolted states, forthwith.

2 That the Southern ports, at least from Charleston to New Orleans, ought to be closed at once.

3 That the mouth of the Mississippi ought to be effectually guarded, so as to prevent all ingress and egress.

4 That the approach to New Orleans, by Lake Ponchatrain ought to be at our entire command.

5 That the Mississippi River at the mouth of the Ohio, ought to be commanded by the Government so as to control the navigation and trade at that centre. And to that end, we must have a floating force, sufficient to command the river and its banks.

6 That the safety of St. Louis ought to be ensured.

7 The Seat of Government, of Course must be protected, cost what it may.

8 We must maintain full command of the Chesapeake Bay-as that locks up Virginia and Maryland and half of North Carolina-and to that end, we must maintain Fort Munroe [sic].

9 Harpers Ferrry [sic] and Gosport ought to be protected, if possible.

Note: Of course I am for "enforcing the laws" with no object but to reinstate the authority of the Government and restore the integrity of the nation. And with that object in view I think it would be wise and humane, on our part so to conduct the war as to give the least occasion for social and servile war, in the extreme Southern States, and to disturb as little as possible the accustomed occupations of the people.

The plan of practically closing the ports of the insurgent States and cutting off all their Sea-ward commerce seems to me the easiest cheapest and most humane method of restraining those States and destroying their Confederation. Their people are high spirited and ready enough to fight, but impatient of control and unable to bear the steady and persistent pressure which we can easily impose and which they have no means to resist. They are an anomalous people- the only agricultural people that I know of, who cannot live upon the products of their own labor, and have no means of their own to take those products to market.

Cotton and Sugar, their only staples must be exported and sold, in order to procure the very necessaries of life. They must sell or sink into poverty and ruin; and if their ports be closed, they must send their products northward, to the ports of the States yet faithful. In that way their products will find their way into the markets of the world, and they will be compelled to receive their foreign supplies, through the same channels. And thus our duties (somewhat deminished [sic], it may be) will still be paid, and the people of the loyal states will get the profits of the trade. While they getting no revenue from duties, must resort to direct taxation, and that to an extent their people cannot long endure.

This plan it seems to me if strictly and persistently enforced, while it would not necessarily lead to the shedding of a drop of blood, would nevertheless, be very coersive [sic] and very promising of success. At all events it is the most feasible project for the accomplishment of our main end, that has occured to ny mind.

Others may think it wiser and better to adopt a line of action more bold and warlike, and to enforce the laws at the point of the bayonet, in the field. If that opinion prevail then I have a suggestion to make, as to the point of attack which seems to me, at once the most vunerable and most important.

On this hypothesis it is my opinion that the Government ought to take and hold with strong hand, the City of New Orleans, And that, I believe can be done without much fighting, provided the plan be judiciously matured and preparations be made with intelligence, secresy [sic] and celerity.

I suggest some of the means not presuming to cover all the details of a design so complicated and so beyond the range of my habitual thoughts. And

1 The Naval force on the Gulf ought to be stronger than necessary for a mere blockading squadron and the enemy might be made to understand it so. And there ought to be on board the Squadron some of our best artillery, to cooperate with the force to decend the river.

2 There is , up the river, a class of men, the hardiest on the continent-the boatmen now for the most part not well employed, and likely to see worse times, as soon as the trade of New Orleans is stopped or crippled, by our squadrons in the Gulf. These men are hardy and bold, and will be ripe for such a brilliant enterprise.

I know several gentlemen who know these men perfectly and can exercise a great influence over them. I think that 8 or 10,000 of these men could be properly engaged, by usinbg the proper agencies. These, being equipped and concentrated at Cairo, might with such other means as may be thought needful, run to New Orleans, in four days, or less and there cooperating with the fleet, might very probably take the city without a serious struggle.

The success of such a scheme might make it proper to use some freedom in stopping the mails and Telegraphs for a few days.

I do not propose this plan, for I greatly prefer to accomplish the end by blockade. But if regular war be inaugurated in the valley of the Mississippi, we must command the mouth of the river, and ought to command also the mouth of the Ohio. This last would protect and control the commerce and navigation of nearly ten millions of our people.

Respectfully submitted

Note 2. In order to ensure constant employment to the insurgent troops our cruisers could frequently look in upon the enemies [sic] forts, if only to see that they are well manned and guarded, and now and then make a shew of force off the most exposed points of the enemy coast.
[Two clippings, one giving a map of the fortifications in Charleston Harbor, the other a map of those in Pensacola Harbor.]