Some of Joseph Lancaster Brents thoughts, distilled by some period of time after the close of the war of 1861-65, came to me in the form of a text authored by him in 1885 and continiously updated until 1916. It is titled "Mobilizable Fortifications and Their Controlling Influence in War". Though most of Brent's words deal with the railroad, some acknowledgement of the importance of marine operations is mentioned throughout the 143 pages it comprises. The following extract covers the period in question. Henry E. Whittle

I am extracting from that text references to waterborne operations, the following from Chapter I, The resources of Aggressive War. The following is the closing paragraph of Section 12 followed by Section 13 in its entirety.:

The whole area of the South is penetrated by numerous navigable rivers and streams, which together with their confluents and the open ports of the seaboard enabled vessels of war to exercise a great and controlling influence.

Section 13. Owing to their greater skill and manufacturing resources, the North built ironclad gunboats against which it was utterly vain for the South to contend. These gunboats, built of small size and draft penetrated creeks and bayous wherever a draft of a few feet of water could be found. Protected by iron armor, and armed with one or more heavy guns, they controlled all the conditions of war within the range of their fire.

Wherever a navigable river, creek , or bayou flowed, the Confederate armies were unable to cross if a Federal gunboat were on it. How often has a force of ten thousand men, well equipped with field artillery, been checked and paralyzed by its inability to cross a small stream held by a Federal ironclad apon which there were only fifty men!

In a struggle like this, numbers were insignificant: a gunboat with fifty men on it dominated the field of war within range of its guns and movements.

In the alluvial districts of the South, notably in Louisiana, the rivers and bayous run upon a ridge, and the level of the land, unbroken by hills, declines backward from either bank of a stream; hence an ironclad gunboat was higher than the adjacent country, and its guns absolutely controlled both sides of the river.

Masses of troops were unable to come on either side of such rivers or bayous within range of the hostile artillery, which were generally heavy 9-, 11-, or 15-inch smooth-bore guns. When an ironclad would, as it often chanced, come upon such a stream by surprise, the troops camped near it would be compelled to abandon their camps in great confusion, and to retreat inland beyond the range of its guns.

Nothing could oppose these iron-clad gunboats except boats like them. Projectiles of field artillery rebounded from their sides, and finally, in the country infested by them, orders were issued to the Confederate field batteries not to waste ammunition by firing on them.

Accompanying these armored gunboats of the Union government were a class of gunboats protected only with thin iron, sufficient to turn the projectile of small arms, but not to resist artillery fire. These gunboats, generally called tinclads on account of their weak armor, were easily captured by field artillery at close range, but could not be taken by infantry alone.

It was by utilizing steam and iron that the Federals were able to penetrate into every corner of the Southern states, while telegraphs kept up a perfect communication over the vast area of the country in which they campaigned.

These causes, intensified by a vigorous and complete blockade of the sea-coast, resulted in the most thorough and complete triumph of the Union arms.

It is hazarding little to say that if steam had not been invented and utilized the result would have been very doubtful.

In addition to these agencies, the skill and resouces of the North organized vast armies, and at the close of the war the Federals had over a million of soldiers under arms.