There are a couple of points about ram tactics during the late unpleasantness that are important: 1) The object of ramming was not to penetrate into the hull of the opponent. If you did this (Virginia and Albemarle), there was a fair chance that the large crushed area around the ram would hold the attacker in place and take her down with the victim. 2) if your ram had a more conventional bow and the ramming surface consisted of railroad strip iron, then the penetration problem was reduced and the damage to the victim tended to be limited to sprung hull planking. Ramming was most effective against a disabled or stationary target. To function safely, the ram's boilers and engines required a secure foundation. The amount of "play" available in the steam lines was also important. Rigid line systems were vulnerable to damage from shock. From careful reading of reports from several engagements in SW Louisiana, I suspect that ramming appeared attractive because it minimized the target presented by the ram as it approached head on, and many of the waters in which the engagements were fought had limited room for maneuver. With the advent of the spar torpedo, the ability to inflict heavy damage with a vessel of small displacement became possible. But such a vessel would have limited endurance and require "hardening" to protect the crew and boilers. Virtually all civilian conversions on both sides required adaptations to protect their boilers and engines. Riverboats had their boilers, steam lines and engines forward and vulnerable. When possible, attempts were made to drop the boilers into the hold. This was done with Ellet's ram fleet and was an advantage over the typical Confederate conversion which usually lacked this modification and attempted to provide other means of protection. Protection might include wooden bulkheads with compressed cotton in between and/or railroad ironing over the bulkheads. Such protection rarely went aft of the side-wheels. In general, riverboats were poorly adapted as rams due to light construction to allow shallow draft. This limitation was minimized by the tendency of the ram's target to be similarly framed and planked. Converted tow-boats were of stronger construction, but tended to draw more water and frequently had vulnerable walking beam engines. The Webb falls into this category. She did not have her boilers dropped. It is interesting to note that she was armed with a spar torpedo system for her run past New Orleans. The Confederate Navy and Army took separate approaches to the design of vessels for this mission. Mallory is on record informing CDR Bulloch in Britain that torpedo craft required a top speed of at least 10 mph. The battle at Memphis is unusual in that it featured two squadrons of rams with every incentive to engage at all costs - the Union vessels were running downstream. If they became disabled, they would drift into enemy territory. The Confederate vessels were short of coal and literally had to win or be destroyed. Because they ran with the current, the Union rams had a slight speed advantage during the action. But speed in a ram attack is a mixed blessing. The ability to have superior speed to secure a favorable angle for a ram attack is a plus. But high speed collisions with the victim were to be avoided, the damage to the attacker could be very heavy. The practical goal of a ram attack was to disable the enemy, not sink them. It can be argued that in some ways, the Memphis battle could be likened to a game of "chicken". Any commander who lost his nerve and turned his vessel away from the bow of the enemy made himself vulnerable. The issue of damage to the victor in a ramming action is rarely mentioned, but critical. Manassas, Webb and Queen of the West were all badly damaged in action during ramming attacks. The celebrated Galveston attack by the Neptune and Bayou City frequently overlooks the fact that the Neptune was sunk and the Bayou City disabled by becoming stuck in the machinery of the Harriet Lane. In all of these actions, the rams were extremely vulnerable if their enemy were quickly reinforced. Albemarle was nearly pulled under when her ram stuck in the hull of the Southfield. Virginia had a scare after ramming a Union sloop. It is not clear why Albemarle was not armed with the spar torpedo for her action at Plymouth, as they had become standard issue for Confederate armor-clads in 1863. Such a device would have given a clear tactical advantage in close actions within rivers.